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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Douglas Raymond Colvin was convicted and sentenced for second degree
murder in 1992. He is appealing the district court’s orders denying three motions he
filed in 2015: (1) a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, (2) a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and (3) a motion for appointment of standby counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The district court concisely set forth the procedural background of Colvin’s case
and the nature of the three motions that are relevant on appeal, as follows (with, where
possible, bracketed references to the record):
On July 16, 1992, the defendant, Douglas Raymond Colvin,
pleaded guilty to Murder in the Second Degree. [R., pp.34-35.] He did so
pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement with the State. [R., pp.31-33.] On
October 26, 1992, Colvin was sentenced to imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for not less than 25 years and not more than life. [R., pp.4951.] The sentence imposed was consistent with the Rule 11 agreement.
On February 26, 1993, Colvin filed a Rule 35, I.C.R., motion, seeking a
reduction of his sentence. [R., pp.53-54.] On July 28, 1993, the Court
heard that motion and denied it. [R., pp.71-72.] Since then, the criminal
case has lain dormant. Colvin filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief
in Latah County Case No. SP-1993-0001. Colvin’s petition was eventually
denied on November 7, 2003, after an evidentiary hearing.
On March 23, 2015, this Court received Colvin’s “Motion for
Correction of an I.C.R. Rule 35(a) Illegal Sentence from the Face of the
Record” and Colvin’s “Motion for Appointment of ‘Standby’ Counsel.”
[R., pp.73-87.] In his motions, Colvin argues that the Court’s invitation to
“make a personal statement to the Court” at his sentencing was
insufficient to provide him an opportunity to present mitigating information
or evidence that could have affected his sentencing. (Mot. for Correction,
p. 2 [R., p.82].) He requests that this Court appoint an attorney to assist
him in bringing this motion. (Mot. for Appointment of Counsel, p. 2
[R., p.74].) He also requests that it not be a Latah County Public
Defender, because he claims to have been inadequately represented by a
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Latah County Public Defender in the past.
Counsel, p. 2 [R., p.74].)

(Mot. for Appointment of

On April 6, 2015, this Court received another motion from Colvin,
titled a “Motion for Relief.” [R., pp.101-112.] This motion asks the Court
to allow Colvin to withdraw his guilty plea in this case to correct “manifest
injustice,” since he claims that his plea was invalid. (Mot. for Relief, pp. 12 [R., pp.101-102].) It also asks this Court to take judicial notice of a
report that Colvin claims supports one of his assertions. (Mot. for Relief,
p. 2 [R., p.102].) In addition, Colvin requests that this Court appoint
standby counsel to assist him in bringing this motion and in considering a
civil claim against the State for violating his rights. (Mot. for Relief, p. 3
[R., p.103].) The State responded [R., pp.113-115] and Colvin submitted
an answer to that response [R., pp.119-126]. In his answer, Colvin asks
the Court to convert his motion into a request for declaratory relief to state
whether he has the right to file a second petition for post-conviction relief
based on his arguments asserted here. [R., pp.116-118.]
(R., pp.137-139.)
On June 9, 2015, the district court entered its “Order Denying Defendant’s
Motions,” which denied Colvin’s three motions. (R., pp.137-158.) Colvin filed a timely
appeal. (R., pp.164-169.)
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ISSUES
Colvin states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Colvin’s I.C.R. 35
motion to correct an illegal sentence?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Colvin’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Colvin’s
motion for appointment of standby counsel?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Has Colvin failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence?
2. Has Colvin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
3. Has Colvin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for appointment of standby counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Colvin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Colvin’s three motions, to wit: (1) motion to correct an

illegal sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a), (2) motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, and (3) motion to appoint standby counsel. On appeal, Colvin contends that the
district court erred by denying his Rule 35(a) motion, and abused its discretion in
denying his other two motions. Colvin’s arguments fail.

B.

Standard Of Review
“As a general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is illegal or

was imposed in an illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review over questions of
law.” State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011) (citing State v.
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009)).
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609, 610, 97 P.3d 476,
477 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90
(Ct. App. 1986)); State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000).
The defendant has the burden to show that the withdrawal should be allowed, State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990), and a denial order will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d
871, 873 (1992).
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Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) is “within the court’s
discretion” as long as “the court appropriately finds that the claims presented are
frivolous.” Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App.
1996) (addressing a post-conviction proceeding and not a Rule 35 motion).

C.

Colvin Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Either Erred Or
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Three Motions
In its “Order Denying Defendant’s Motions” (R., pp.137-158), the district court

correctly applied the legal standards and properly denied Colvin’s three motions. The
state adopts, fully incorporates, and relies upon the decision of the district court,
attached as Appendix A, for its reasoning and analysis on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s June 9, 2015
Order Denying Defendant’s Motions.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney____________________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of August, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ John C. McKinney_______________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/dd
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APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ~ COUNTY OF LATAH
)

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS RAYMOND COLVIN,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-1992-0730

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS
MOTIONS TO CORRECT
SENTENCE, WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA, TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE,
AND FOR STANDBY COUNSEL

)

------.--------->
I. BACKGROUND
On July 16, 1992, the defendant, Douglas Raymond Colvin, pleaded guilty to
Murder in the Second Degree. He did so pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement with
the State. On October 26, 1992, Colvin was sentenced to imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for not less than 25 years and not more than life. The sentence
imposed was consistent with the Rule 11 agreement. On February 26, 1993, Colvin
filed a Rule 35, I.C.R., motion, seeking a reduction of his sentence. On July 28,
1993, the Court heard that motion and denied it. Since then, the criminal case has
lain dormant. Colvin filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief in Latah County
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS
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Case No. SP-1993-0001. Calvin's petition was eventually denied on November 7,
2003, after an evidentiary hearing.
On March 23, 2015, this Court received Calvin's ''Motion for Correction of an
I.C.R. Rule 35(a) lliegal Sentence from the Face of the Record" and Calvin's ''Motion
for Appointment of 'Standby' Counsel." In his motions, Colvin argues that the
Court's invitation to "make a personal statement to the Court" at his sentencing
was insufficient to provide him an opportunity to present mitigating information or
evidence that could have affected his sentencing. (Mot. for Correction, p. 2.) He
requests that this Court appoint an attorney to assist him in bringing this motion.

(Mot for Appointment of Counsel, p. 2.) He also requests that it not be a Latah
County Public Defender, because he claims to have been inadequately represented
by a Latah County Public Defender in the past. (Mot for Appointment of Counsel, p.
2.)

On April 6, 2015, this Court received another motion from Colvin, titled a
"Motion for Relief." This motion asks the Court to allow Colvin to withdraw his
guilty plea in this case to correct "manifest injustice," since he claims that his plea
was invalid. (Mot. for Relief, pp. 1-2.) It also asks this Court to take judicial notice
of a report that Colvin claims supports one of his assertions. (Mot. for Relief, p. 2.)
In addition, Colvin requests that this Court appoint standby counsel to assist him in
bringing this motion and in considering a civil claim against the State for violating
his rights. (Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) The State responded and Colvin submitted an
answer to that response. In his answer, Colvin asks the Court to convert his motion
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into a request for declaratory relief to state whether he has the right to file a second
petition for post-conviction relief based on his arguments asserted here.
Each motion is considered separately below.
II. COLVIN'S RULE 35 MOTION
Rule 35 allows a defendant to ask the court to correct or reduce a sentence
already imposed. I.C.R. 35. Rule 35 motions range from the correction of legal
errors to a plea for leniency. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400
(2007). It is important at the outset to identify the nature of the motion, because
there are different requirements for different kinds of Rule 35 motions.
Here, Colvin makes a specific challenge to the method of his sentencing. He
claims that the Court's invitation to "m:ake a personal statement to the Court" at his
sentencing was in$ufficient to provide him an opportunity to present mitigating
information or evidence that could have affected his sentencing. (Mot. for

Correction, p. 2.) Colvin claims that the process employed abrogated his "right to
allocution that is required via Idaho Constitution (Art. I § 13) and Federal
Constitution (U.S.C. Amendments 5 & 14) [sic]." (Mot. for Correction, p. 2.) Colvin
also cites the Idaho Criminal Rules, which provide, in relevant part, that "[b]efore
imposing sentence the court ... shall address the defendant personally to ask if the
defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation
of punishment." I.C.R. 33(a)(l). This rule generally requires that "[a] trial judge
before sentencing must directly address the defendant, and offer h:im personally a
clear opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf, and to present any
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information in mitigation of punishment." State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 480, 546
P.2d 1180, 1188 (1976).
The reason Colvin phrases his motion to challenge an "illegal sentence" is
apparently because of the limits contained in Rule 35. An "illegal sentence."
apparent "from the face of the record," can be corrected "at any time." !.C.R. 35(a).
On the other hand, if the sentence is merely "imposed in an illegal manner," the
court can only correct it "within 120 days after the filing of a judgment of
conviction." !.C.R. 35(b). A defendant must file a Rule 35 motion within the
specified time and the cour:t must rule on the motion within a reasonable time! or
the court loses jurisdiction. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 353-54, 825 P.2d 74,
76-77 (1992); State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1987). This is
because "[o]nce a judgment becomes final, .. . a trial court does not have jurisdiction
to amend or set aside the judgment absent a statute or a rule extending

jurisdiction." State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 614, 226 P.3d 552, 556 (Ct. App.
2010).
Colvin, in his answer to the State's response to this motion, purports to be
confused about the ~erence between I.C.R. 35(a) and 35(b), and concedes that his
motion may be mistaken. (Answer to Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 2.) His
argument evolves in a way to allege that the sentence imposed violated LC. §§
19-2510 and§ 19-106(2), that there is "fraud and misleading information in the
judgment" he just discovered, and that (trial and post-conviction) counsel were
ineffective because they did not identify these errors. (Answer to Latah Cnty.
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Prosecutor's Resp., pp. 2-4.) While Colvin remains unclear about his theory of relief,
he states: "I am certain I have grounds for relief of some kind." (Answer to Latah

Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 2.) However, this Court can find no ground for relief
under I.C.R. 35(a) and does not have jurisdiction to consider any relief based on
! .C.R. 35(b).

A. Colvin's motion challenges a "sentence imposed in an illegal
man.ner," rather than an "illegal sentence."
Despite Calvin's assertions to the contrary, his motion does not challenge an
"illegal sentence" under I.C.R. 35(a); rather, it challenges a "sentence imposed in an
illegal manner" described in I.C.R. 35(b). This Court
can make that determination
,
because: (1) a factual inquiry is required, which distinguishes the two kinds of Rule
35 motions; (2) the claimed errors are not apparent from the face of the record; and
(3) the challenged errors are proc~dural, and thus go to the manner in which the
sentence was imposed, rather than the legality or illegality of the sentence itself.
Because Calvin's motion challenges the manner in which the sentence was imposed,
it is a motion brought pursuant to Rule 35(b). Calvin's time for filing a Rule 35(b)
motion expired on February 23, 1993. To the extent that Calvin's motion is made
under I.C.R. 35(b), this Court is without jurisdiction to hear it.
1. A factual inquiry is required to analyze Colvin's claim.

Calvin's motion requires a factual inquiry, which means it is not a motion to
correct an illegal sentence. The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he term
'illegal sentence' is not defined under Rule 35." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84,
218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). The Court noted that both LC.R. 35 and the
ORDER DENYING
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corresponding federal rule (Fed. R. Crim. P. 35) have "the narrow function ... to
permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine error
occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence." Id.
at 85, 218 P.3d at 1146 (quoting Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424,430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472
(1962). Thus, "the term 'illegal sentence' under Rule 35(a) is narrowly interpreted
as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing." Clements, 148
Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147. The Court further expla4ted that
Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts
underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is illegal;
rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in
which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the
original sentence was excessive.

Id. (citation omitted). Thus, any argument regarding sentencing that requires a
"factual determination" is, by definition, "not illegal from the face of the record,"
even when a factual determination is required to determine the correct law to apply.

Id. at 87, 218 P.3d at 1148. Such arguments are appropriately "raised on direct
appeal, [or] made before the defendant's Rule 35 motion." Id.
Here, the determination of whether the judge's invitation to "make a
statement" was adequate depends on what the judge said and how Colvin
understood it. The only way to delve into these questions is to read a transcript of
what the judge said and Colvin's responses and to elicit testimony from Colvin
regarding his understanding of the process. If a review of the record indicates
Colvin offered a statement that provided mitigating information, then he was
ORDER DENYING
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clearly given an adequate opportunity to allocute. However, this determination
requires a factual inquiry. Because Colvin's motion requires a factual
determination, it is not the "narrow" kind of Rule 35(a) motion that is meant to
correct an illegal sentence. In other words, this is a mo_tion to correct a "sentence
imposed in an illegal manner" - as contemplated by Rule 35(b).

2. Colvin's allegation of error is not evident from the face of
the record.
Any error in Calvin's sentence is not apparent from the "face of the record."
Even before statehood, Idaho courts understood the stark contrast between a
factual inquiry and a review on "the face of the record." People v. Ah Hop, 1 Idaho
698, 703 (1878) (differentiating a review "upon the merits" from a determination of
'

"errors appearing on upon the face of the record"). An "illegal sentence" is one
where "the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or
where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence was excessive."

Clements, 148 Idaho at 86,218 P.3d at 1147. Such errors would be apparent upon a
cursory review of the record (on its face) and a study of the applicable law. Here,
the reverse is required: the applicable law needs only a review, while the facts ·
Colvin argues require serious study. Ther~fore, the alleged "illegality" of the
sentence is not apparent from the face of the record.
3. Colvin's allegation of error involves procedure, not
substance.
Colvin's motion is appropriately categorized as a motion challenging a
"sentence imposed in an illegal manner," and not as a challenge to an "illegal
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sentence" because it involves procedure, not substance. Al.locution is not a right
guaranteed by Due Process under the Constitutions of Idaho or the United States.

State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 888, 303 P.3d 241, 247 (Ct. App. 2013), review
denied (July 18, 2013) (pointing out that "the·Ninth Circuit held that allocution is a
due
process right, but limited its holding to circumstances where the defendant asks
•,
to speak at sentencing and is denied that opportunity''); State v. Abdullah, No.
31659, 2015 WL 856787, at *86 (Idaho Mar. 2, 2015) reh'g denied (May 28, 2015)
(noting that "[e]very federal circuit court of appeals, except the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, has held that allocution is not a constitutional right") (quotation marks
and citation omitted); Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 425-26, 82 S.Ct. 468, 469-70 (1962).
Further, "a violation by the district court of a rule of procedure does not necessarily
equate to a deprivation of a constitutional right." Id. (citation omitted). Al.locution
"is purely a statutory, procedural right guaranteed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and
Idaho Code section 19-2510." Abdullah, 2015 WL 856787, at *87.
In his answer, Colvin claims that there is "fraud and misleading information
in the Judgment" that he just discovered. (Answer to Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp.,
p. 3.) He never clearly explains what the alleged "fraud and misleading
information" is. (Answer to Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 3.) One possible
explanation for his claim is that he objects to the language in the judgment that
states he had no legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced. As
explained below in section II.B., this Court concludes that Colvin's claim of error in
this regard is meritless. It also appears that another error Colvin complains of is
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that the sentence was entered "outside [Calvin's] view and knowledge." (Answer to
Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 3.) However, this claim is meritless because he
cites no facts to support this claim.
Colvin's argument, when reduced to its core, is that the judge ip.ade an error
at the sentencing hearing. The right to allocute is procedural. Id. Procedure is
defined as "[t]he judicial rule or manner for carrying on a civil lawsuit or criminal
prosecution." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1323 (9th ed. 2009). It is notable that both
the definition of procedure and I.C.R. 35 use the term "manner." Because allocution
is a procedural right, any violation was an error in the manner of carrying out
Colvin's sentencing. Therefore, Colvin's challenge can only be against a "sentence
imposed in an illegal manner," rather than an "illegal sentence." As such, it falls
under Rule 35(b), I.C.R., and it is untimely and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
it.

B. Even if the facts are apparent from the face of the record, there was
no error in the sentencing hearing.
Even if Calvin's challenge goes ~o an alleged illegality of the sentence itself
(under I.C.R. 35(a)), and not merely the manner in which it was imposed (under
!.C.R. 35(b)), the record does not establish any error. Colvin was given the
opportunity to allocute and took that opportunity to speak to the Court.
Recently, Idaho's appellate courts loosened some of the stringent
requirements regarding allocution. For instance, in Hansen, the trial court told the
defendant that he would have "an opportunity to make a statement on your own
behalf or to present to me any evidence or information in mitigation in an effort to
ORDER DENYING
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lessen, any punishment I might otherwise impose.', Hansen, 154 Idaho at 885, 303
P .3d at 244. The trial court then heard from three witnesses, heard argument from
the attorneys, and questioned the defendant regarding some aspects of his
Presentence Investigation Report. Id. However, the·trial court then sentenced the
defendant without giving him the previously-described opportunity to allocute. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not violate the
defendant'~ right to allocute because the record did not support the conclusion that
the "failure to later invite a statement was an affirmative denial of the opportunity
to allocute and not simply an oversight." Id. at 888, 303 P.3d at 247.
Colvin also argues, in his answer, that the Court failed "to present [him] with
[a]§ 19-2510 inquiry,"l in violation of his due process rights. (Answer to Latah

Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 3.) Colvin states that "[i]f the court had asked me if I
had legal cause to show why not to pronounce judgment... [sic] I would have
exercised my§ 19-106.2(21 right to appear and defend in person and with counsel to
confer with in personally addressing the court's§ 19-2510 inquiry." (Answer to

Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 3.) However, the transcript shows that the Court
asked the question: "Does the defendant have any lawful cause to show why
l

Colvin appears to be referring to his right to present legal cause to show why judgment should not
have been pronounced against him (at that ti.me). I.C. § 19-2510 (titled "Arraignment for
Sentence") provides, in full:
·
When the defendant appears for judgment he must be informed by the court, or by
the clerk, under its direction, of the nature of the indictment and of his plea, and the
verdict if any thereon, and must be asked whether he has any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him.

2

LC.§ 19-106 describes some rights of a criminal defendant. It provides, in full:
In a criminal action the defendant is entitled:
1. To a speedy and public trial.
2. To be allowed counsel as in civil actions, or to appear and defend in person
and with counsel.

ORDER DENYING
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judgment should not be pronounced against him at this time?" to which Calvin's
attorney, Mr. Henegen, replied, "No, your Honor." (Tr., p. 92, 11. 19-22.) Colvin
claims that "the court had a duty to present me with§ 19-2510 inquiry [sic] and I
had a fundamental right to personally make my§ 19-106.2 presentation." (Answer

to Latah Cnty. Prosecutor's Resp., p. 4.) This assertion of error fails for at least two
reasons. First, Colvin cites no authority stating that it was inappropriate to ask his
attorney, rather than him directly, whether there was legal cause not to pronounce
sentence. Second, Colvin seems to think that I.C. § 19-106 provides him with a
right to both have an attorney represent him and to represent himself, operating
like a light switch that can be turned off and on again at any time. That is not an
accurate view of the right to self-representation. See State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275,
277-78, 61 P.3d 632, 634-35 (Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the timeliness required of a
request for self-representation).
At the beginning of Calvin's sentencing hearing, Calvin's attorney indicated
that he would call Colvin to the stand to present evidence in mitigation (after the
State called its witnesses who presented evidence in aggravation). (Tr., p. 43, 11. 2025.) After the State's witnesses, tpe court invited Calvin's attorney to "submit
evidence of circumstances in mitigation." (Tr., p. 76, ll. 5-7.) In response, Calvin's
attorney asked for a brief recess -which was allowed. (Tr., p. 76, 11. 8-17.) After
returning from that recess, Calvin's attorney stated that "[t}he defense will not
present any evidence of circumstances in mitigation." (Tr., p. 77, 11. 1-2.) It is clear
that Colvin was also afforded the opportunity to present mitigating evidence and
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declined to do so. Calvin's attorney also submitted argument, which pointed to
Calvin's mental health as a reason to be lenient and emphasize treatment over
punishment. (Tr., pp .. 77-83.) After that, the court told Colvin that he had "the
right to make a personal statement to the Court," and invited him to do so. (Tr., p.
76, 11. 5-7.) Colvin then made a statement. (Tr., p. 83, 1. 13-p. 84, 1. 9.) Colvin
explained that he tried to get help for his problems, that he did not believe in
violence, that he regretted what happened, and hoped that the court would order
treatment. (Tr., p. 83, 1. 13-p. 84, I. 9.) Colvin was then sentenced.
The case of State v. Hansen provides helpful precedent. State v. Hansen, 154
Idaho 882,888, 303 P.3d 241, 247 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied (July 18, 2013). In
Hansen, the defendant was never given an opportunity to allocute. Id. at 888, 303
P.3d at 247. Nevertheless, the appellate court found no error because there was not
an affirmative denial of the opportunity. Id. Here, Colvin was given the chance to
speak and say anything he wanted. He spoke in response to the Court's invitation.
Colvin has failed to establish any error whatsoever in his sentencing.
ID. COLVIN'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA

Colvin asks to withdraw his guilty plea "[t]o correct manifest injustice." (Mot.
for Relief, p. 1.) A defendant can move to withdraw a guilty plea any time "before

sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended." I.C.R. 33(c). However,
"to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea." Id.
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Colvin's claim of manifest injustice in his case appears to be the contention
that his guilty plea was invalid. (Mot. for Relief. p. 1.) Colvin claims that his guilty
plea is invalid for three reasons: (a) he received ineffective ass_istance of trial
counsel, (b) the plea agreement itself was either invalid as written or was breached,
and (c) he did not understand the plea agr~ement. However, none of these reasons
provides a basis to find Colvin's guilty plea invalid. Calvin's motion does not
establish "manifest injustice" and should therefore be denied.

· A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Colvin claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He
maintains he was "misadvised by counsel to plead guilty'' because his attorney was
"unable to build [Calvin's] defense because the county public defender contract
didn't pay him enough." (Mot. for Relief, pp. 1-2.) In support of this claim, Colvin
submits a letter, dated December 28, 1992, written by Colvin to Judge Hamlett,
explaining that his attorney did not interview all of the individuals Colvin asked

him to interview. (Mot. for Relief, ex. A.)

As a threshold matter, Colvin confessed to this murder and pleaded guilty
pursuant to a Rule 11 agreement. It is hard to imagine under these facts what his
lawyer could have uncovered ifhe had conducted a more in depth inquiry.
In addition, Colvin has already asserted this argument. In his petition for
post-conviction relief, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his "trial
counsel did not interview witnesses which the defendant asked him to contact and
talk to." (SP-1993-0001 [CV-1993-0865], Am. 'd Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 3,
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,r 9(a).)

In Calvin's post-conviction relief case, this claim was summarily dismissed.

(SP-1993-0001 [CV-1993-0865], Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Respondent's Mot. to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 1.)
"The doctrine of res judicata" includes "issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)."

Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007) (citation
omitted). Claim preclusion prohibits the same claim from being made between the
same parties in a subsequent action. Id., see also Johnson v. State, No. 41414, 2015
WL 1881943, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015). "For claim preclusion to bar a
subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim;
and (3) final judgment." Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. A "final judgment" requires
that:
[IJn an action between the same parties upon the same claim or
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and
should have been litigated in the first suit.

Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70,878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) (citation
omitted).
Here, Colvin is barred from asserting ineffective assistance of counsel by
claim prech,1sion. First, the parties are the same - both this case and Calvin's
petition for post-conviction relief involve Colvin and the State of Idaho. Second, it is
the same claim - ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, there was a final
judgment in the previous case - Calvin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
was summarily dismissed. Colvin's previous claim was defeated, and therefore
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"every matter which might and should have been litigated" there is barred from
being litigated here.
Colvin is barred by claim preclusion from asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel as a basis for his motion. Colvin has already had this claim adjudicated
after a full and fair proceeding. As a result, this claim cannot be reconsidered.
B. Invalidity or Breach of the Plea Agreement
Next, Colvin claims that his guilty plea is invalid because the plea agreement
was either breached (since his attorney was not present at his psychological
evaluation) or invalid (if it allowed his attorney not to be present at the evaluation).
(Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) Colvin's claim centers around the fact that his "attorney was

unable to appear and confer or advise [him] during the evaluation." (Mot. for Relief,
p. 3.) Calvin's argument is that the psychological evaluation was a "critical stage"
that is included in the constitutional guarantee of representation by counsel. (Mot.
for Relief, p. 3.)

The Idaho Supreme Court has found that a psychosexual evaluation, as
distinguishable from a "routine" presentence investigation, is a critical stage of a
criminal prosecution. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,. 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837
(2006). This conclusion was supported by a U.S. Supreme Court case finding that a
"pre-trial psychiatric evaluation was a critical stage of the proceedings." Id. (citing
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1877 (1981)). However, the

Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that its "finding that a Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation
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inquiring to a defendant's future dangerousness, does not necessarily require the
presence of counsel during the exam." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837

(emphasis in original). Therefore, a defendant does have a right to the advice of
counsel "regarding his participation in the psychosexual evaluation.11 Id. at 563,
149 P.3d at 838.
Here, Colvin received the advice of counsel that ·he should participate in the
psychological evaluation. The evaluation was specifically included in the Rule 11
Plea Agreement. (Mot. for Relief, ex. C,

,r 5.)

That plea agreement was signed by

both Colvin and his attorney. (Mot. for Relief, ex. C, p. 3.) Colvin does not have a
constitutional right to have his attorney "appear and confer or advise [him] during
the evaluation." (Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) Therefore, the State did not breach the plea
agreement by conducting the psychological evaluation without the attendance of
Calvin's attorney and the plea agreement is not invalidated, since it does not "allow"
an unconstitutional process. Colvj.n's right to the advice of counsel was not violated,
and therefore is not a reason to invalidate Calvin's guilty plea.

C. Lack of Understanding of the Plea Agreement
Finally, Colvin claims that his guilty plea is invalid because he did not
understand the plea agreement. (Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) Colvin states that his
attorney "did not let me read the Plea Agreement before or during the hearing and
set the plea on the table, opened it to the last page and told me to sign it." (Mot. for
Relief, p. 3.) Colvin claims that his attorney told him that his sentence would only
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· be ten years. (Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) He claims he was "under duress and severely
depressed at the time of all of the hearings." (Mat. for Relief, p. 3.)
Colvin included the plea agreement itself with his motion. (Mot. far Relief,
ex. C.) It is a short agreement. It has an introduction, seven paragraphs over two
pages, and then spaces for signatures on the third page. (Mot. for Relief, ex. C.)
The plea agreement clearly states that Colvin would plead guilty to an amended
charge of Murder in the Second Degree and be imprisoned for life "as the maximum
period of confinement," with the parties being left free to argue "for any minimum
period of confinement of ten (10) years up to a fixed life sentence." (Mot. for Relief,
ex. C,

,r,r 1-4.)
'!A plea agreement is similar to a contract and is often analyzed according to

contract principles." State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 785, 241 P.3d 955, 958 (2010)
(also noting that "[a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains
are essentially contracts") (citation omitted). This means that, first, a plea
agreement should be analyzed "within its four corners" to understand its meaning.
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253,258,281 P.3d 90, 95 .(2012). "The meaning of an
unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract's
own words." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376,389 (2004) (citations
omitted). Any patent ambiguities in the plea agreement are "interpreted in favor of
the defendant." State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596, 226 P.3d 535, 538 (2010).
"Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding also reflects the proper
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constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." Id. (citation
omitted, emphasis in original).
The plea agreement is not ambiguous regarding the sentence Colvin would
receive. (Mot. for Relief, ex. C,

,r 3.)

Even if it were ambiguous, Colvin's claimed

understanding (i.e., that he would be sentenced to ten years in prison) is not
reasonable. (compare Mot. for Relief, p. 3 with ex. C,

,r 3.)

Further, it is

unbelievable that Colvin's attorney would tell him that he would only be sentenced
to ten years in prison, when the plain text of the agreement states he would be
sentenced to a maximum (indeterminate) period of life in prison and "that it would
be consistent with this agreement for the State to argue for a fixed life sentence,
and for the Court to impose a fixed life sentence." (Mot. for Relief, ex. C,

,r,r 3-4.)

For these reasons, Colvin's claimed misunderstanding of the plea agreement cannot
serve as a basis to invalidate his guilty plea.
IV. COLVIN'S MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

At one point in his Rule 33(c) Motion for Relief, Colvin moves for the Court to
take judicial notice of an official report by the Idaho Attorney General's Office.

(Mot. for Relief, p. 2.) With his motion, Colvin submits a letter he received from
Paul Panther, Deputy Attorney General and Chief of the Criminal Law
Division, stating that Colvin's request for "[a]ny and all reports and/or findings of
studies conducted and/or published by any person or entity relating to Idaho's
Public Defender system between the dates of 2004 through 2014" is granted and the
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documents were (apparently) provided. (Mot. for Relief, ex. B.) However, Colvin
has not submitted the documents.
The Court cannot grant Colvin's motion for two reasons: (1) he has not
provided the report that he asks the Court to take judicial notice of, and (2) his
request is about public defenders between 2004 and 2014, and does not have
anything to do with his case, that was resolved by 1993. (Even Colvin's PostConviction action was :finally resolved by 2003, with only attorney's fees going on to
January 2004.) Therefore, Colvin's motion to take judicial notice will be denied.
V. COLVIN'S MOTION FOR STANDBY COUNSEL

For the reasons explained above, Colvin's underlying motions will be denied.
Given the lack of merit in the motions, an attorney would not assist Colvin.
Accordingly, Colvin's requests for an attorney to assist him in bringing those
motions will be denied.
Colvin also obliquely mentions that "a guilty plea does not foreclose a
subsequent claim by the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or related state actions."
(Mot. for Relief, p. 3 (capitalization adjusted)). He requests "standby" counsel to

"confer on state law in this regard" and help him decide "whether to amend,
supplement or dismiss this motion." (Mot. for Relief, p. 3.) Colvin appears to be
exploring a possible civil lawsuit for a deprivation of his rights. However, public
defenders are not available in bringing these kinds of c_ivil actions, as there is no
constitutional right to representation in a civil action against the government. See
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Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 180, 392 P.2d 542, 548 (1964) (quoting 162 A.L.R.
922). Therefore, his request for "standby'' counsel in this regard will also be denied.

VI. CONCLUSION
Colvin's underlying Rule 35 motion is without merit. First, to the extent that
Colvin's motion is made under !.C.R. 35(b), challenging the manner in which his
sentence was imposed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion because
(despite its terminology) it is an untimely challenge to the manner in which his
sentence was imposed. !.C.R. 35(b). Second, to the extent that Colvin's motion is
made under I.C.R. 35(a), this Court concludes that no relief is warranted because
Colvin was provided an adequate opportunity to allocute and exercised his right to
allocution.. In other words, Colvin is not the victim of an illegal sentence.
Likewise, Colvin's motion for relief, under Rule 33(c), will be denied. Colvin
has not shown any basis for his asserted "manifest injustice." He is precluded from
arguing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he had no constitutional right
to have his attorney with him at the psychological evaluation, and tlie plea
agreement is unambiguous, while his claimed understanding of the plea agreement
is unreasonable.
Good cause appearing,
It is ORDERED that defendant's "Motion for Correction of an I.C.R. Rule
35(a) Illegal Senten~e from the Face of the Record" is DENIED, with prejudice. (To

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS

Page20

the extent the defendant's motion is actually brought pursuant to Rule 35(b), this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.)
It is FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's "Motion for Relief' to withdraw
his guilty plea is DENIED,. with prejudice.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion to take judicial notice is
DENIED, with prejudice.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motions for the appointment
of standby counsel are DENIED, with prejudice.

a-~

Dated this ---1-- day of June 2015.

Jo R. Stegner
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO CORRECT SENTENCE,
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA, TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND FOR STANDBY
COUNSEL were delivered by the indicated methods to the following:
William W. Thompson, Jr.
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843

[ ] E-Mail
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ t/1Hand Delivery

Douglas Raymond Colvin
Pro Se Defendant
ISCC G-110 B #36777
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

[ ] E-Mail
(V"fU.S. Mail

on this

[

] Fax

[

] Hand Delivery

~1ay of June 2015.
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